Privacy Impact Assessment Under DPDPA

Not every data processing activity requires a full Privacy Impact Assessment. PIAs consume resources and should be reserved for situations where they provide meaningful value. Establishing clear triggers ensures assessments occur when needed without creating unnecessary administrative burden.

High-value PIA triggers include: new systems or applications processing personal data, significant changes to existing data processing activities, new categories of personal data being collected, processing activities involving sensitive data or vulnerable populations, new sharing arrangements with third parties, and introduction of new technologies with privacy implications like AI or biometric systems.

Lower-risk activities may warrant lighter-touch assessment: routine updates to existing systems without changing data flows, processing changes that reduce rather than expand data handling, and activities previously assessed where circumstances remain unchanged. The goal is proportionate assessment, not bureaucratic checkbox completion.

Effective PIAs follow structured methodology while remaining adaptable to specific circumstances. The core process involves: describing the data processing activity, identifying privacy risks, evaluating risk severity and likelihood, determining appropriate mitigations, and documenting decisions and rationale.

Description of processing should capture: what personal data is involved, how data is collected, what purposes drive processing, who has access to data, how long data is retained, whether data is shared externally, and what security measures protect data. This description provides the factual foundation for risk analysis.

Risk identification examines how the processing might harm Data Principals or violate their rights. Categories of risk include: inadequate consent or transparency, excessive data collection beyond purposes, unauthorised access or disclosure, inaccurate data causing harm, inability to exercise rights, and security vulnerabilities enabling breaches. Systematic consideration of risk categories ensures comprehensive assessment.

Identified risks require evaluation to determine which warrant mitigation investment. Risk evaluation considers both the severity of potential harm and the likelihood that harm will occur. Risks that are both severe and likely require immediate attention; risks that are unlikely or minor can be accepted or addressed opportunistically.

Severity assessment considers: the nature of potential harm (financial, reputational, physical, psychological), the reversibility of harm, the number of individuals potentially affected, and the vulnerability of affected populations. Processing children's data or health information typically presents higher severity than processing business contact information.

Likelihood assessment examines: the probability of risk materialising given current controls, historical incident patterns for similar processing, threat environment and attacker motivations, and control effectiveness and reliability. A risk that has materialised before or for which clear attack patterns exist warrants higher likelihood ratings.

For risks exceeding acceptable thresholds, mitigation strategies reduce either severity or likelihood. Mitigation approaches fall into several categories: avoiding the risk by eliminating the processing activity, reducing severity through data minimisation or anonymisation, reducing likelihood through enhanced security controls, and transferring risk through insurance or contractual allocation.

Effective mitigations are specific, implementable, and verifiable. "Improve security" is not a mitigation; "implement encryption for data at rest using AES-256" is. Mitigations should have assigned responsibility, implementation timelines, and verification mechanisms to ensure follow-through.

Some residual risk will remain after mitigation. Organisations must explicitly accept remaining risks, documenting the rationale for acceptance. This acceptance should occur at appropriate organisational levels, with higher residual risks requiring more senior approval.

PIA documentation serves multiple purposes: demonstrating compliance to regulators, supporting internal governance decisions, enabling future review when circumstances change, and creating institutional knowledge that survives personnel transitions.

Documentation should include: the processing activity description, identified risks and evaluation, selected mitigations and implementation status, residual risks and acceptance decisions, stakeholders consulted, and approval sign-offs. The documentation should be sufficiently detailed that a reviewer unfamiliar with the project could understand the analysis and its conclusions.

PIAs are not one-time exercises. Changes in processing activities, threat environments, or legal requirements may invalidate prior assessments. Establish triggers for PIA review and update, and maintain version history showing how assessments evolved over time.